De se belief and rational choice

Synthese 190 (3):491-508 (2013)
Abstract
The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s credences in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all
Keywords Sleeping beauty  De se updating  Decision theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0044-0
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References found in this work BETA
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs.Michael Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.

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