Synthese 190 (3):491-508 (2013)
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Abstract |
The Sleeping Beauty puzzle has dramatized the divisive question of how de se beliefs should be integrated into formal theories of rational belief change. In this paper, I look ahead to a related question: how should de se beliefs be integrated into formal theories of rational choice? I argue that standard decision theoretic frameworks fail in special cases of de se uncertainty, like Sleeping Beauty. The nature of the failure reveals that sometimes rational choices are determined independently of one’s credences in the kinds of ‘narrow’ de se propositions that Sleepy Beauty has set in relief. Consequently, in addition to pinpointing a failure of standard decision theoretic frameworks, this result casts doubt on a large class of strategies for determining principles for the rationally updating de se beliefs in cases like Sleeping Beauty, and also calls into question the importance of making such a determination at all
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Keywords | Sleeping beauty De se updating Decision theory |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11229-011-0044-0 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Can Rational Choice Guide Us to Correct de Se Beliefs?Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4107-4119.
Sleeping Beauty: Why Violations of Probability Laws Are `Deal' Breakers.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
To Sleep, Perchance to Have Indiscriminable Collocated Awakenings: Ay, There's the Rub.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
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