Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):297-314 (2011)

Authors
Lionel Shapiro
University of Connecticut
Abstract
There is a standard objection against purported explanations of how a language L can express the notion of being a true sentence of L. According to this objection, such explanations avoid one paradox (the Liar) only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if L can contain its own truth predicate, we can identify another notion it cannot express, on pain of contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. This paper seeks to undermine such ‘revenge’ by arguing that it presupposes a dubious assumption about the linguistic expression of concepts. Successful revenge would require that there be a notion other than truth that plays the same role with respect to concept-expression that truth is naturally thought to play before we are confronted with the Liar paradox.
Keywords truth  concept-expression  Kripke  Tarski's theorem
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DOI 10.1080/00048401003695156
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.

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Citations of this work BETA

Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
Model-Theoretic Semantics and Revenge Paradoxes.Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1035-1054.
Non-contractability and Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):905-917.
Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Alethic Vengeance.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Understanding the Liar.Douglas Patterson - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
Liar Paradox.Bradley Dowden - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox.Patrick Greenough - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.
A Dilemma for Dialetheism.Jason Zarri - 2010 - The Dualist 15 (Spring):21-31.

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