Explanatory burdens and natural law: Invoking a field description of perception-action

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):905-906 (2001)
Abstract
Although we agree with Hommel et al. that perception and action refer to one another, we disagree that they do so via a code. Gibson (1966; 1979) attempted to frame perception-action as a field phenomenon rather than as a particle phenomenon. From such a perspective, perception and action are adjoint, mutually interacting through an information field, and codes are unnecessary.
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Perception-Action as Reciprocal, Continuous, and Prospective.Jeffrey B. Wagman - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):219-220.

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