Authors
Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral beliefs, and hence no moral knowledge. In response, I first develop what is perhaps the most natural reply on behalf of realism namely, that many of our highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs are immune to evolutionary influence and so can be used to assess and eventually resuscitate the epistemic merits of those that have been subject to such influence. I then identify five distinct ways in which the charge of massive coincidence has been understood and defended. I argue that each interpretation is subject to serious worries. If I am right, these putative defeaters are themselves subject to defeat. Thus many of our moral beliefs continue to be highly warranted, even if moral realism is true
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68
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References found in this work BETA

Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
Evolution and Normative Scepticism.Karl Schafer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488.
Biology and Ethics.Philip Kitcher - 2005 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.

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