Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809 (2018)

Authors
Nathaniel Sharadin
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Epistemic instrumentalists face a puzzle. In brief, the puzzle is that if the reason there is to believe in accord with the evidence depends, as the instrumentalist says it does, on agents’ idiosyncratic interests, then there is no reason to expect that this reason is universal. Here, I identify and explain two strategies instrumentalists have used to try and solve this puzzle. I then argue that we should find these strategies wanting. Faced with the failure of these strategies, I articulate a heretofore neglected solution on behalf of instrumentalism.
Keywords epistemic instrumentalism  rationality of belief  reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1245-3
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Epistemic Rationality.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):608-630.

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