David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 35 (1):63-74 (2007)
In recent years, many incompatibilists have come to reject the traditional association of moral responsibility with alternative possibilities. Kevin Timpe argues that one such incompatibilist, Eleonore Stump, ultimately fails in her bid to sever this link. While she may have succeeded in dissociating responsibility from the freedom to perform a different action, he argues, she ends up reinforcing a related link, between responsibility and the freedom to act under a different mode. In this paper, I argue that Timpe’s response to Stump exploits concessions she need not have made. The upshot is that, contrary to what Timpe maintains, there is no reason to doubt that Stump's brand of incompatibilism is a genuine alternative to the traditional variety
|Keywords||Kevin Timpe Eleonore Stump Compatibilism Source incompatibilism Frankfurt-style cases Principle of Alternative Possibilities Causal determinism Moral responsibility Flickers of freedom|
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References found in this work BETA
David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
Carl Ginet (1996). In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing. Philosophical Perspectives 10:403-17.
David P. Hunt (2000). Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.
David P. Hunt (2005). Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Robinson (2012). Modified Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples and Flickers of Freedom. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.
David Hunt & Seth Shabo (2013). Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
Seth Shabo (2014). It Wasn't Up to Jones: Unavoidable Actions and Intensional Contexts in Frankfurt Examples. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.
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