Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-19 (2008)

Abstract
Why can't deliberation conclude in an intention except by considering whether to perform the intended action? I argue that the answer to this question entails that reasons for intention are determined by reasons for action. Understanding this feature of practical deliberation thus allows us to solve the toxin puzzle.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,287
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Intention and Motivational Strength.Hugh McCann - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
Reasons and Intentions.Bruno Verbeek (ed.) - 2007 - Ashgate.
Exciting Intentions.Alfred R. Mele - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312.
Von Wright on Historical Causation1.Elazar Weinryb - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):327-338.
Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
299 ( #23,418 of 2,325,680 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,599 of 2,325,680 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes