Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482 (2003)

Abstract
Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that it is good (in whichever sense of good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, allthings-considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to p. But there is no such gap between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective; the question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is true.
Keywords Aiming, Metaethics, Dissertation, Belief
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ISBN(s) 0031-8108
DOI 10.1215/00318108-112-4-447
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References found in this work BETA

Normative and Recognitional Concepts.Allan Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.
Normative and Recognitional Concepts.Allan Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Transparent Delusion.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):183-201.

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