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Abstract
In this paper I examine a new variant of the well-known idea that the self is an abstract object. I propose a simple model of the self as a property of temporal slices of a body's history. I argue that this model, when combined with even a modest realism with regard to properties, implies that the self has many of the chief features traditionally attributed to selves. I conclude that this model allows one to reconcile the full reality of the self with even the most deflationary materialistic theories of consciousness.
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Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
Real Patterns.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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