Abstract
Graham Priest introduces an informal but presumably rigorous and sharp ‘provability predicate’. He argues that this predicate yields inconsistencies, along the lines of the paradox of the Knower. One long-standing claim of Priest’s is that a dialetheist can have a complete, decidable, and yet sufficiently rich mathematical theory. After all, the incompleteness theorem is, in effect, that for any recursive theory A, if A is consistent, then A is incomplete. If the antecedent fails, as it might for a dialetheist, then the consequent may also fail to hold. One somewhat friendly purpose of my ‘Incompleteness and inconsistency’ was to improve the technical situation for the dialetheist, eschewing reliance on an informal provability predicate. Another, less friendly purpose was to bring out what I took to be some untoward consequences of the situation. It seems that Priest accepted at least some of the improvements that I attempted. In the second edition of In contradiction, he responded to the alleged untoward consequences. One purpose of this note is to revisit the technical and philosophical situation. There were some errors in my original presentation, brought out by discussion with Priest and by Hartry Field’s analysis of the second incompleteness theorem in such contexts. A second task here is to present a sort of Curry version of the Gödel incompleteness situation. I tentatively conclude that even for a dialetheist, an interesting and complete theory is not as easy to come by as it may look—at least not for theories of arithmetic that are plausible for a dialetheist.