Analysis 48 (1):13-15 (1988)

This note is a reply to margery bedford naylor's "a note on david lewis's realism about possible worlds" . naylor asks why, if we accept david lewis's argument for real possible worlds , we should not accept an analogous argument for impossible worlds. i argue that the latter argument is invalid on the modal realist account of possibility and thus has no force for an adherent of lewis
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