Authors
Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University
Teresa Kouri Kissel
Old Dominion University
Abstract
We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that various logics are constitutive for thought within particular practices, but none are constitutive for thought as such.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2017.1357495
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 57,138
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth as One and Many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Clarendon Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Value of Thinking and the Normativity of Logic.Manish Oza - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (25):1-23.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1:1-18.
Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Sebastiano Moruzzi & Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):323-346.
Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information.Patrick Allo - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
Normativity for Alethic-Logical Pluralists.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws.Jessica Leech - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-03-12

Total views
16 ( #618,202 of 2,411,692 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #86,492 of 2,411,692 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes