Moral and theological realism: The explanatory argument

Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329 (2007)

Authors
Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of moral realism on this front are quite different from those of the theist. Key Words: causal power • explanatory power • Gilbert Harman • moral facts • moral realism • theism.
Keywords Gilbert Harman   Moral   Causal Power   Explanatory Power   Theism   Realism   Moral Facts
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DOI 10.1177/1740468107083247
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Two Cornell Realisms: Moral and Scientific.Elliott Sober - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):905-924.
Robust Moral Realism: An Excellent Religion.David Killoren - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):223-237.

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