Multiple realizations

Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654 (2000)
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Keywords A Priori  Epistemology  Properties  Realizability  Reductionism  Fodor, J  Sober, E
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DOI jphil2000971214
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Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument.Markus Eronen - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.

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