Oxford University Press (2003)
Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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|Call number||BJ1500.M67.S53 2003|
|ISBN(s)||0199259755 0199280207 9780199259755 9780199280209|
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Citations of this work BETA
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
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