Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):19-42 (2003)
Authors
Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University
Abstract
Sections 3.16 and 3.23 of Roger Penrose's Shadows of the mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) contain a subtle and intriguing new argument against mechanism, the thesis that the human mind can be accurately modeled by a Turing machine. The argument, based on the incompleteness theorem, is designed to meet standard objections to the original Lucas-Penrose formulations. The new argument, however, seems to invoke an unrestricted truth predicate (and an unrestricted knowability predicate). If so, its premises are inconsistent. The usual ways of restricting the predicates either invalidate Penrose's reasoning or require presuppositions that the mechanist can reject
Keywords incompleteness  Lucas  mechanism  Penrose  truth
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1022863925321
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Minds, Machines, And Mathematics A Review of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose. [REVIEW]David J. Chalmers - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2:11-20.
Penrose's Gödelian Argument A Review of Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose. [REVIEW]S. Feferman - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2:21-32.

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Citations of this work BETA

Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Proving That the Mind Is Not a Machine?Johannes Stern - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):81-90.
Turing's Responses to Two Objections.Darren Abramson - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (2):147-167.

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