Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361 (2016)
Abstract
A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2015.1068348
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References found in this work BETA
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

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Citations of this work BETA
Justifying the Principle of Indifference.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-28.

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