Nietzsche on becoming a self worth being

Nietzsche urges us not to embrace any one perspective of the world, at the same time as he vociferously and repeatedly attacks whole ways of life. These two aspects of Nietzsche's work seem to be in tension with one another--what perspective allows Nietzsche to be so opinionated? Nietzsche insists that all experience is from a perspective and that there is no inherently privileged perspective. This is the "perspectivist" Nietzsche that Derrida focuses on. Yet not only does Nietzsche insist on denigrating the perspective of others, he seems to acknowledge that such attacks are not very worthwhile if they too are just from another perspective. Thus thinkers like Schacht argue that there is a privileged perspective in Nietzsche, and that this privilege is unique because of the relationship it has with the "natural" and the "healthy." The Gay Science presents a Nietzsche who integrates these two seemingly incompatible positions, for in this work Nietzsche makes an exciting synthesis possible through the idea of the eternal recurrence and through his attack on the unitary self. Nietzsche urges us to create ourselves as affirmers, but the stance of affirmation is not in itself a perspective; rather, a central characteristic of affirmers is the ability to embrace numerous perspectives
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