On Durant Drake’s “May Belief Outstrip Evidence?”

Ethics 125 (2):536-539 (2015)
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Abstract

In his "May Belief Outstrip Evidence?" (1916) Durant Drake argues that beliefs may sometimes permissibly outstrip evidence. Drake's novel idea is that epistemic reasons are not the final arbiter of the justificatory status of beliefs. In this short note I motivate Drake's idea by suggesting an analogy between the epistemic justification of belief and the moral justification of intention.

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Nathaniel Sharadin
University of Hong Kong

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