Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit

Philosophical Studies:1-28 (forthcoming)
Abstract
What is required for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? We reject extant answers and propose an alternative. Our account differs from competing answers in two ways: first, it is contrastive, in that actions promote the satisfaction of desires only as contrasted with other possible actions. Second, it employs a notion of expected fit between desire and world, defined as the weighted sum of the fit between the desire and the world in all possible outcomes, where each weight is given by the probability of the agent’s obtaining the relevant outcome. According to our proposal, then, an action promotes a desire when the expected fit for the desire given that the agent performs the action is greater than the expected fit of the desire given that the agent performs the contrasting action. We highlight this account’s attractive features and explain how it improves on its competitors.
Keywords promotion  desire  rationality  Humeanism  probabilism  contrastivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1062-2
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,812
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Mind 106 (424):791-794.
The Reasons That Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
In Defence of Proportionalism.Daan Evers - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):313-320.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Probabilistic Promotion Revisited.Jeff Behrends & Joshua DiPaolo - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1735-1754.
The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.
A Puzzle About Desire.Chase Wrenn - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.
Conflicts of Desire.Steven Arkonovich - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):51-63.
Desire.Richard Swinburne - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (234):429 - 445.
Wants and Desires: A Critique of Conativist Theory of Motivation.Chris Meyers - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research:357-370.
Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis.Charles B. Cross - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
The Practical Rationality of Induction.Aristophanes Koutoungos - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:27-30.
Added to PP index
2018-01-11

Total downloads
33 ( #177,109 of 2,231,601 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #12,561 of 2,231,601 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature