Paradoxes of Probability

In Tamas Rudas (ed.), Handbook of Probability Theory with Applications (2008)
We call something a paradox if it strikes us as peculiar in a certain way, if it strikes us as something that is not simply nonsense, and yet it poses some difficulty in seeing how it could make sense. When we examine paradoxes more closely, we find that for some the peculiarity is relieved and for others it intensifies. Some are peculiar because they jar with how we expect things to go, but the jarring is to do with imprecision and misunderstandings in our thought, failures to appreciate the breadth of possibility consistent with our beliefs. Other paradoxes, however, pose deep problems. Closer examination does not explain them away. Instead, they challenge the coherence of certain conceptual resources and hence challenge the significance of beliefs which deploy those resources. I shall call the former kind weak paradoxes and the latter, strong paradoxes. Whether a particular paradox is weak or strong is sometimes a matter of controversy—sometimes it has been realised that what was thought strong is in fact weak, and vice versa,— but the distinction between the two kinds is generally thought to be worth drawing. In this Cchapter, I shall cover both weak and strong probabilistic paradoxes.
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