Reflection, Conditionalization and Indeterminacy about the Future

The Reasoner 8:65-66 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper shows that any view of future contingent claims that treats such claims as having indeterminate truth values or as simply being false implies probabilistic irrationality. This is because such views of the future imply violations of reflection, special reflection and conditionalization.

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Michael Shaffer
Gustavus Adolphus College

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References found in this work

Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Belief and the will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 235-256.
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
The epistemology of perception.Daniel OBrien - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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