Representations - senses and reasons

Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74 (1991)
Abstract A survey of different senses of the term ?representation? is presented. The presentation is guided by the appraisal that this key term is employed in the cognitive literature in different senses and that the distinction between these is not always explicitly stated or appreciated. Furthermore, the different senses seem to be associated with different rationales for the postulation of representation. Given that there may be a lack of convergence between the various senses of the construct in question and the rationales for its postulation, a clear differentiation of these may be crucial for any evaluation of the role of representations in cognition and in cognitive theory
Keywords Psychology  Reasons  Representation  Science  Sense
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DOI 10.1080/09515089108573036
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Benny Shanon (1992). Are Connectionist Models Cognitive? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
Benny Shanon (1991). Representations - Senses and Reasons. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74.

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