The Reasoner 11:73-74 (2017)

Authors
Michael Shaffer
St. Cloud State University
Abstract
The main examples of pragmatic encroachment presented by Jason Stanley involve the idea that knowledge ascription occurs more readily in cases where stakes are low rather than high. This is the stakes hypothesis. In this paper an example is presented showing that in some cases knowledge ascription is more readily appropriate where stakes are high rather than low.
Keywords decision theory  pragmatic encroachment  knowledge
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