The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass

Authors
Finnur Dellsén
Inland Norway University Of Applied Sciences
Nathaniel Sharadin
Syracuse University
Abstract
The moral of Buridan's Ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet it is also commonly believed that it cannot ever be rational to believe one proposition rather than another if one lacks stronger reason to do so. This asymmetry has been taken to indicate a deep difference between epistemic and practical rationality. According to the view articulated here, the asymmetry should instead be explained by the difference between rational intentions and rational actions. Thus, it turns out, Buridan's Ass-style cases do not indicate an asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality as such.
Keywords buridan's ass  belief  intention  degree of belief  degree of intention  rationality
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DOI 10.1017/apa.2017.22
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Erkenntnis 25 (6):205.

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