Atheists sometimes use Bertrand Russell's teapot argument, and its variants with other objects in place of the teapot, to argue for the rationality of atheism. In this paper I show that this use of the teapot argument and its variants is unacceptably circular. The circularity arises because there is indirect evidence against the objects invoked in the arguments.
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The God Delusion: Phenomenon.Richard Dawkins - 2007 - Free Inquiry 27:11-12.
Where’s The Evidence?Michael Antony - 2010 - Philosophy Now 78:18-21.

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