Abstract
Fred Dretske's theory of indicatory functions (Dretske 1988 & 1994)is undoubtedly one of the more ambitious attempts to articulate a sound naturalistic foundation for an adequate theory of
intentional content. In what follows I argue that, contrary to Dretske's explicit intentions, his theory fails a crucial adequacy test - that of
accounting for mental content as a system-intrinsic property. Once examined in light of the first-person perspective of an embodied psy-
chological agent, I argue, it becomes clear that neither 'indication', nor 'function', as used by Dretske, can be consistently applied. Dre-
tske's theory of indicatory functions is, thus, doubly incoherent. It is then argued that the problems identified here stretch far beyond
Dretske's specific theory - covering the better part of contemporary attempts to naturalize content. I conclude by suggesting that these
general problems of representation, exemplified so vividly in Dretske's theory, also testify to the inadequacy of the quest to reduce tel-
eological phenomena (function and purpose) to predominantly mechanistic variables.