Two kinds of intentionality in Locke

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):554-586 (2010)

Authors
Lionel Shapiro
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Ideas play at least two roles in Locke's theory of the understanding. They are constituents of ‘propositions,’ and some of them ‘represent’ the qualities and sorts of surrounding bodies. I argue that each role involves a distinct kind of intentional directedness. The same idea will in general be an ‘idea of’ two different objects, in different senses of the expression. Identifying Locke's scheme of twofold ‘ofness’ reveals a common structure to his accounts of simple ideas and complex ideas of substances. A consequence is a distinction among substance sorts parallel to one of his distinctions between primary and secondary qualities
Keywords Locke  ideas  qualities  substances  natural kinds  representation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01375.x
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.

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