Two Problems for Accepting as Intending

Ethics 128 (3):626-641 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It’s possible to accept or to reject a promise. According to a new proposal by Abraham Roth, accepting a promise involves intending that the promisee perform the promised action. According to Roth, this view is supported by rational symmetries between promissory acceptance and intention. Here, I show how these symmetries actually generate two problems for the view.

Similar books and articles

How Do We Conceive The Future?Hristo P. Todorov - 2009 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):30-36.
The Primacy of the Practical.John Brunero - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle.Ken Levy - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.
Promising without Intending.David Owens - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (12):737-755.
Intending, acting, and doing.Luca Ferrero - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):13-39.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-22

Downloads
891 (#18,011)

6 months
114 (#47,397)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nathaniel Sharadin
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Promises, obligation, and reliance.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):150-170.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
The Realm of Rights.J. J. Thomson - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):538-540.

View all 12 references / Add more references