Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788 (2016)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
|
Keywords | Representationalism Naive Realism Perceptual Content Bayesian inference Charles Travis |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2016 |
DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2016.1142071 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
View all 45 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).
Similar books and articles
Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219.
Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.Keith A. Wilson - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism.René Jagnow - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
A Nonrepresentational Approach to Perception.Jason Leddington - 2011 - In Georg Bertram, Robin Celikates, Christophe Laudou & David Lauer (eds.), Expérience et Réflexivité. L'Harmattan. pp. 45-54.
The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
The Nonconceptual Representational Content of Perceptual Experience.Wayne Thomas Wright - 1999 - Dissertation, Temple University
Strong Representationalism and Centered Content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jan Almäng - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161-177.
Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-01-12
Total views
803 ( #8,804 of 2,506,004 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #26,393 of 2,506,004 )
2016-01-12
Total views
803 ( #8,804 of 2,506,004 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #26,393 of 2,506,004 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads