Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788 (2016)

Authors
Ayoob Shahmoradi
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
Keywords Representationalism  Naive Realism  Perceptual Content  Bayesian inference  Charles Travis
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2016.1142071
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References found in this work BETA

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).

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