Why we reason the way we do

Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325 (2013)
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10.1111/phis.12016

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Citations of this work

What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.
Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.
Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.

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References found in this work

Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.
Epistemic Rules.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500.

View all 13 references / Add more references