A paradigm shift in Heidegger research

Continental Philosophy Review 34 (2):183-202 (2001)
The Beiträge zur Philosophie mandates a paradigm shift in Heidegger scholarship. In the face of (1) widespread disarray in the current model, the new paradigm (2) abandons Sein as a name for die Sache selbst, (3) understands Welt/Lichtung/Da as that which gives being, (4) interprets Dasein as apriori openedness rather than as being-there, (5) understands the Kehre as the interface of Geworfenheit and Entwurf, not as a shift in Heidegger's thinking, (6) interprets Ereignis as the opening of the Da rather than as appropriation, and (7) understands human finitude as what gives all forms of being and all epochs in the history of being. The conclusion alludes to the function of Mitdasein (co-openness) as die Sache selbst.
Keywords Philosophy   Phenomenology   Philosophy of Man   Political Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/A:1017568025461
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Tucker McKinney (2016). Objectivity and Reflection in Heidegger’s Theory of Intentionality. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):111--130.
Louiza Odysseos (2009). Constituting Community: Heidegger, Mimesis and Critical Belonging. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 12 (1):37-61.
Rafael Winkler (2013). Seinsverständnis and Meaning in Heidegger. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):149-162.

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