Authors
Yonatan Shemmer
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Humeans believe that at least some of our desires give us reasons for action. This view is widely accepted by social scientists and has some following among philosophers. In recent years important objections were raised against this position by Scanlon, Dancy, and others. The foundations of the Humean view have never been properly defended.In the first part of the paper I discuss some objections to the Humean position. In the second part I attempt to provide an argument for the claim that the Humean view gives us a plausible, even if not exclusive, understanding of our notion of reasons. The particular version of the Humean view I set out to defend is that only desires that the agent is not alienated from, and that are not impulses, are reason giving.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr200775222
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Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):439-459.
An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.
Silencing Desires?Attila Tanyi - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.

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