Authors
Joshua Shepherd
Carleton University
Abstract
Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one’s overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one’s overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend the claim that one key functional expression of halfhearted action is the possession of impaired control over the action in question. Finally, I elucidate a puzzle that sometimes arises with respect to halfhearted action. The puzzle arises when an agent’s commitment in acting conflicts with an agent’s acceptance of poor performance.
Keywords control  action  motivation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.009
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,046
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Intention at the Interface.Ellen Fridland - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):481-505.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Halfhearted Action and Control.Shepherd Joshua - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
Conscious Control Over Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.
The Contours of Control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Mental Action and Causalism.Jing Zhu - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):89.
Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
Action, Control and Sensations of Acting.Benjamin Mossel - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.
Deciding as Intentional Action: Control Over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.
Mental Action and the Threat of Automaticity.Wayne Wu - 2013 - In Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillman Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 244-61.
Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):101-26.
The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13:1 - 30.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-02-12

Total views
39 ( #277,884 of 2,454,504 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #98,263 of 2,454,504 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes