Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (2):182-205 (2020)

Abstract
The Pareto principle is a normative principle about preferences that advocates concordance with unanimous preference. However, people have perspectives not just preferences. Evaluating preferences...
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1177/1470594x19898866
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,975
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle.Philippe Mongin - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):511-532.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle.Philippe Mongin - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):511-532.
Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and Dictatorship.Osamu Mori - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (3):257-272.
The Pareto Principle.Jürgen Backhaus - 1980 - Analyse & Kritik 2 (2):146-171.
A Pareto Principle for Possible People.Christoph Fehige - 1998 - In Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Preferences. De Gruyter. pp. 509--43.
Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation.Philippe Mongin - 2008 - Journal of Economic Theory 141:p. 100-113.
Preference Aggregation After Harsanyi.Matthias Hild, Mathias Risse & Richard Jeffrey - 1998 - In Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles & John A. Weymark (eds.), Justice, political liberalism, and utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-219.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-04-25

Total views
15 ( #694,353 of 2,498,167 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #427,476 of 2,498,167 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes