Ratio 31 (3):321-330 (2018)

Authors
Joshua Shepherd
Carleton University
Abstract
In this paper I consider an argument for the possibility of intending at will, and its relationship to an argument about the possibility of believing at will. I argue that although we have good reason to think we sometimes intend at will, we lack good reason to think this in the case of believing. Instead of believing at will, agents like us often suppose at will.
Keywords voluntarism  intention  believing at will  deciding  supposition
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DOI 10.1111/rati.12198
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References found in this work BETA

The Chinese Rune Argument.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.
The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.
Attitudinal Control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.

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