Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e240 (2022)
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Abstract

The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.

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VII*—Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1):117-134.

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