Note on the scope of truth-functional logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):327-328 (1999)
A plausible and popular rule governing the scope of truth-functional logic is shown to be indequate. The argument appeals to the existence of truth-functional paraphrases which are logically independent of their natural language counterparts. A more adequate rule is proposed
Keywords paraphrase  logic  logical strength
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004367312707
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