On Spohn’s rule for revision of beliefs


Abstract
The main ingredients of Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs are (1) a functional representation of an epistemic state called a disbelief function and (2) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we provide a new axiomatic definition of an epistemic state and study some of its properties. Second, we study some properties of an alternative functional representation of an epistemic state called a Spohnian belief function. Third, we state a rule for combining disbelief functions that is mathematically equivalent to Spohn's belief revision rule. Whereas Spohn's rule is defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and some features of the final epistemic state, the rule of combination is defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and the incremental epistemic state representing the information gained. Fourth, we state a rule of subtraction that allows one to recover the addendum epistemic state from the initial and final epistemic states. Fifth, we study some properties of our rule of combination. One distinct advantage of our rule of combination is that besides belief revision, it can be used to describe an initial epistemic state for many variables when this information is given as several independent epistemic states each involving few variables. Another advantage of our reformulation is that we can show that Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs shares the essential abstract features of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. One implication of this is that we have a ready-made algorithm for propagating disbelief functions using only local computation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,696
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Structural Equations and Beyond.Franz Huber - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.
A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
New Foundations for Counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-07-26

Total views
15 ( #582,201 of 2,280,846 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #840,891 of 2,280,846 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature