Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):35-48 (2007)

Authors
Patricia Sheridan
University of Guelph
Abstract
Locke's moral theory consists of two explicit and distinct elements — a broadly rationalist theory of natural law and a hedonistic conception of moral good. The rationalist account, which we find most prominently in his early Essays on the Law of Nature, is generally taken to consist in three things. First, Locke holds that our moral rules are founded on universal, divine natural laws. Second, such moral laws are taken to be discoverable by reason. Third, by dint of their divine authorship, moral laws are obligatory and rationally discernible as such. Locke's hedonism, which is developed most fully in his later Essay Concerning Human Understanding, consists in the view that all good amounts to pleasure, with specifically moral good taken to consist in the pleasurable consequences of discharging one's moral duties.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1353/cjp.2007.0012
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John Locke.[author unknown] - 1956 - Philosophy 31 (116):93-93.

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