Philosophy of Science 29 (2):195-203 (1962)
Some issues raised by parapsychological phenomena (psi) are examined in the light of their implications for a philosophy of science. It is shown that the kinds of problems psi poses for science vary with the way one conceives of science as well as one's conception of psi. It is suggested that psi may be a product of the fact that all of our scientific concepts are abstractions and therefore oversimplifications. This raises the possibility that our best conceptual technique for dealing with psi is a non-discursive symbolism, since this would not demand "classes" (oversimplification). Implications of this approach are considered
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