Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of ?phenomenal? concepts. Psychophysical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows. Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account of their distinguishing features has proven to be satisfactory. Leading accounts rely on there being a phenomenological difference between tokening a physical-functional concept and tokening a phenomenal concept. This paper shows that existing psychological data undermine that claim. The paper goes on to suggest that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency may instead by explained by the limited means people typically have for applying their phenomenal concepts. Ways of testing that suggestion empirically are proposed

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,934

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
Phenomenal concepts, color experience, and Mary's puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):97-127.
There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument.David Papineau - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):175.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-12-18

Downloads
139 (#98,619)

6 months
2 (#319,278)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas Shea
School of Advanced Study, University of London

Citations of this work

Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 36 references / Add more references