Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):725-740 (2016)

Authors
Derek Shiller
Princeton University (PhD)
Abstract
It has recently been alleged that expressivism cannot account for the obvious fact that normative sentences and their negations express inconsistent kinds of attitudes. I explain how the expressivist can respond to this objection. I offer an account of attitudinal inconsistency that takes it to be a combination of descriptive and normative relations. The account I offer to explain these relations relies on a combination of functionalism about normative judgments and expressivism about the norms governing them. It holds that the inconsistency of normative judgments is primitive. One potential problem for this view is that the large number of normative primitives that the expressivist will allegedly need to accept will render the view grossly unparsimonious. In defending this thesis, I suggest that it is a mistake to hold the lack of normative parsimony of expressivism against its core psychological claims.
Keywords Negation problem  Inconsistency  Expressivism  Parsimony
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-015-9670-9
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Unity of Moral Attitudes: Recipe Semantics and Credal Exaptation.Derek Shiller - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):425-446.

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