A defense of reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs

Noûs 40 (2):331–346 (2006)

Authors
Tomoji Shogenji
Rhode Island College
Abstract
This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people’s truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony
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DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00612.x
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sincerity and Transmission.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Ratio 29 (1):42-56.

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