Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122 (1992)

Abstract
Can there be a good argument for the total denial of rule following? The question concerns the "total" denial, where the targeted rules include those meta-rules presumably required for philosophical argumentation. In this paper the author contends that such a self-undermining argument can never be a good argument even in a "reductio ad absurdum" form, but that the defender of rule following cannot dismiss a challenge on this ground when the opponent adopts "the virus strategy"
Keywords Argument  Language  Laws  Logic  Nihilism  Relativism  Rule  Scepticism  Kripke, S
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00640.x
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Modest Scepticism About Rule-Following.T. Shogenji - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.

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