Philosophical Studies 140 (3):385 - 399 (2008)
T. M. Scanlon has alleged that the social practice of promising fails to capture the sense in which when I break my promise I have wronged the promisee in particular. I suggest the practice of promising requires the promisee to have a normatively significant status, a status with interpersonal authority with respect to the promisor, and so be at risk of a particular harm made possible by the social practice of promising. This formulation of the social practice account avoids Scanlon’s concern without collapsing into what Elinor Mason has recently referred to as deflationism about promising.
|Keywords||Promising Social practice|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
Citations of this work BETA
Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument.Frank Hindriks - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):465-480.
Directed Obligations and the Trouble with Deathbed Promises.Ashley Dressel - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):323-335.
Similar books and articles
Hume on Promises and the Peculiar Act of the Mind.Rachel Cohon - 2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):25-45.
“Natural Rights and Two Conceptions of Promising”.Peter Vallentyne - 2006 - Chicago-Kent Law Review 81 (9):9-19.
Promises and Perlocutions.Michael G. Pratt - 2003 - In Matt Matravers (ed.), Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. Frank Cass. pp. 93-119.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #116,934 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #317,698 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?