Personal Identity
In Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: (forthcoming)
Abstract
Our aim in this entry is to articulate the state of the art in the moral psychology of personal identity. We begin by discussing the major philosophical theories of personal identity, including their shortcomings. We then turn to recent psychological work on personal identity and the self, investigations that often illuminate our person-related normative concerns. We conclude by discussing the implications of this psychological work for some contemporary philosophical theories and suggesting fruitful areas for future work on personal identity.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Personal Transformation and Advance Directives: An Experimental Bioethics Approach.Brian D. Earp, Stephen R. Latham & Kevin P. Tobia - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (8):72-75.
The Subscript View: A Distinct View of Distinct Selves.Hannah Tierney - 2020 - In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. pp. 126-323.
Las teorías narrativas frente a los casos de duplicación: una defensa de la determinación de la identidad personal.Alfonso Muñoz Corcuera - 2020 - Endoxa 45:175.
References found in this work
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.