Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
What justifies our holding a person morally responsible for some past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for some future persons and not others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? In these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make an essential reference to personal identity. So, for instance, it seems we are justified in holding X responsible for some past action only if X is identical to the person who performed that action. Further, it seems I am justified in my special concern for some future person only if he will be me. Finally, many of us think that while maximization within a life affects only one person, a metaphysical unity, maximization across lives affects many different, metaphysically distinct, persons, and so the latter is wrong insofar as it ignores this fundamental separateness of persons.
|Keywords||Self (Philosophy Identity (Philosophical concept Ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Call number||BD450.S45 2008|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence.Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.
Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity.Karsten Witt, Jens Kuhn, Lars Timmermann, Mateusz Zurowski & Christiane Woopen - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (3):499-511.
The Sense of Diachronic Personal Identity.Stan Klein - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):791-811.
Tracking a Person Over Time Is Tracking What?Andrew Brook - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):585-598.
Similar books and articles
A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms.P. X. Monaghan - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism.Tang Yijie & Yan Xin - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (4):477-501.
Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents.Peter J. Taylor - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304-310.
Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum.H. M. Malm - 1989 - Hypatia 4 (3):128-135.
The Aggressiveness of Playful Arguments.Dale Hample, Bing Han & David Payne - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (4):405-421.
Quantum Chaos and Semiclassical Mechanics.Robert Batterman - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:50-65.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads123 ( #39,982 of 2,178,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #35,618 of 2,178,143 )
How can I increase my downloads?