David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
What justifies our holding a person morally responsible for some past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for some future persons and not others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? In these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make an essential reference to personal identity. So, for instance, it seems we are justified in holding X responsible for some past action only if X is identical to the person who performed that action. Further, it seems I am justified in my special concern for some future person only if he will be me. Finally, many of us think that while maximization within a life affects only one person, a metaphysical unity, maximization across lives affects many different, metaphysically distinct, persons, and so the latter is wrong insofar as it ignores this fundamental separateness of persons.
|Keywords||Self (Philosophy Identity (Philosophical concept Ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Call number||BD450.S45 2008|
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Citations of this work BETA
Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager (2013). Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence. Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.
Karsten Witt, Jens Kuhn, Lars Timmermann, Mateusz Zurowski & Christiane Woopen (2013). Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity. Neuroethics 6 (3):499-511.
Stan Klein (2013). The Sense of Diachronic Personal Identity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):791-811.
Andrew Brook (2014). Tracking a Person Over Time Is Tracking What? Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):585-598.
Raffaele Rodogno (2012). Personal Identity Online. Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):309-328.
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