Blackwell (1984)
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Abstract |
What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
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Keywords | Brain State Consciousness Functionalism Intention Mental Event Metaphysics Mind Personal Identity |
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Reprint years | 1991 |
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ISBN(s) | 0631134328 9780631134329 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Intuitions About Personal Identity: An Empirical Study.Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.
Totipotency, Twinning, and Ensoulment at Fertilization.Rose Koch-Hershenov - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):139 – 164.
In Defence of the Sensible Theory of Indeterminacy.Harold W. Noonan - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):239-252.
The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.
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