Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461 (2009)
AbstractThis essay explores the boundaries of the moral community—the collection of agents eligible for moral responsibility—by focusing on those just inside it and those just outside it. In particular, it contrasts mild mental retardation with psychopathy, specifically among adults. For those who work with and know them, adults with mild mental retardation are thought to be obvious members of the moral community (albeit not full-fledged members). For those who work with and theorize about adult psychopaths, by contrast, they are not members of the moral community (albeit not in such a full-fledged fashion as the insane). Both psychopaths and adults with MMR have a disability, and the essay is interested in how disability sometimes exempts one from the moral community and sometimes doesn't. It will be through two associated puzzles that we will eventually come to see the complicated tripartite relation between disability, responsibility, and moral community.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work
Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.
Social Constraints On Moral Address.Vanessa Carbonell - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):167-189.
Responsibility Without Identity.David Shoemaker - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.
Similar books and articles
Responsibility, Agency, and Cognitive Disability.David Shoemaker - 2010 - In Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson (eds.), Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 201--223.
Intellectual Disability: Ethics, Dehumanization and a New Moral Community.Heather E. Keith - 2013 - J. Wiley.
Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction.David W. Shoemaker - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):99-124.
The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender.Christopher Ciocchetti - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):175-183.
Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power and Accountability From a Pragmatic Point of View.Marion Smiley - 1992 - University of Chicago Press.
The Selves and the Shoemaker: Psychopaths, Moral Judgement, and Responsibility.Stephen Finlay - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):125–133.
Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy.Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson (eds.) - 2010 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited.Neil Levy - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.
Group Moral Agency as Environmental Accountability.Joan Woolfrey - 2008 - Social Philosophy Today 24:69-88.